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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS
the contract did bear a reasonable relation to both Arkansas and Tennessee.
In that case, under Section 1-105(1), the court would have been free to apply
the Arkansas Code if an appropriate relation to Arkansas could have been
established. The fact that the contract was executed in Arkansas, that the
originally designated place of payment was in Arkansas, that the plaintiff's
assignor was an Arkansas company and that the defendant was an Arkansas
resident at the time of the suit would seem to be sufficient to establish this
appropriate relation to Arkansas and allow the court to interpret the contract
according to the Code.
The defendant's claim of usury should have then caused the court to
turn to Section 9-201 of the Code which denies validity to practices, such as
usury, illegal under state law. In the face of this defense, the validity of the
contract should have been determined by the non-Code law of the state. In
doing so, the court would then have been forced to decide whether to apply
only the usury statutes of Arkansas, or the whole law of Arkansas—including
its conflict of laws rule. In the present case, however, the application of either
alternative would not have changed the result.
J.F.B.
SECTION 1-210. General Definitions
CITIZENS NAT'L BANK V. FORT LEE SAV. & LOAN ASS'N [Section 1-201(19)]
213 A.2d 315 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1965) 	 [Section 1-201(20)]
Annotated under Section 3-302, infra. 	 [Section 1-201(25)]
ARTICLE 2: SALES
SECTION 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause
WILLIAMS V. WALKER-THOMAS FURNITURE Co.
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
Plaintiff, a retail furniture dealer, and defendant buyer executed a retail
installment contract for the purchase of a stereo set in April 1962. Under the
contract, the periodic payments were termed "rent" and title was to pass from
the plaintiff to the defendant when the total payments equalled the purchase
price. The contract provided for the plaintiff's right to repossess the goods in
the event of a default in payments. Furthermore, according to the contract,
if the defendant purchased an additional item while an unpaid balance
remained outstanding on an earlier purchase, all future payments were to
be credited pro-rata to the balance remaining in each account. The court
ruled that the effect of this provision was to keep a balance due on every
item purchased until the balance due on all items, whenever purchased, was
liquidated. The defendant defaulted on a payment on the stereo set, and the
plaintiff brought suit to replevy all purchases made on a series of installment
contracts since 1958. The defendant claimed that the contract was uncon-
scionable and, therefore, unenforceable. The court of general sessions
granted judgment for the plaintiff, and the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals affirmed on the ground that it was powerless to do otherwise in the
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absence of legislation or judicial precedent. The United States Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court.
Although the Code was not in effect when these contracts were executed,
the court found no reason to hold that its subsequent adoption effected any
change in the appropriate law. It thus decided that Section 2-302, which gives
the court the discretionary authority to refuse to enforce an unconscionable
contract, was the codification of the evolving common law, and its adoption
by the District of Columbia was "persuasive authority for following the
rationale of the cases from which the section is explicitly derived."
The court then defined unconscionability "to include an absence of mean-
ingful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms
which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." To determine whether
such unconscionability existed, it Iaid down broad guidelines to be considered
by the trial court in the light of all the surrounding circumstances. If there
was an absence of meaningful choice because of a gross inequality in bargain-
ing power, if the buyer, considering his educational level, did not have a
reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or if impor-
tant terms were hidden in a maze of fine print or minimized by deceptive sales
practices, a court may find the contract so commercially unreasonable as to
preclude enforcement. Since these issues of fact were never litigated, the case
was remanded to the trial court for reconsideration,
COMMENT
The court's decision in this case, while based on principles of common
Iaw, is in accord with Section 2-302 of the Code. Furthermore, the factors
which the court enumerates in its discussion of unconscionability are not
intended to be exhaustive in scope or automatic in application, but are illus-
trative of the circumstances which, under the Code, may cause a court to find
a contract to be so one-sided as to be unconscionable.
The dissent advocated a more cautious approach out of fear that this
decision might have an unsettling effect on a large number of installment
credit transactions. This fear is baseless unless, of course, a large number of
retail merchants are actually engaged in unconscionable practices. Section
2-302 may be invoked to deny enforcement of a contract only if it can be
proven to the satisfaction of the court that the contract is in fact uncon-
scionable "in the light of the general commercial background and the com-
mercial needs of the particlar trade or case." Section 2-302, Comment I. In
addition, a finding of unconscionability does not automatically void the entire
contract. The court, in the exercise of its discretion, may refuse to enforce
all or part of the contract or limit the application of any unconscionable
clause. In the interest of certainty, the dissent suggested that supplementary
legislation ought to be utilized to deal with cases of this type. This suggested
approach is contrary to the intent of Section 2-302 as expressed in Official
Comment 1: "This section is intended to make it possible • for the courts to
police explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they find to be un-
conscionable."
J.F.B.
656
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS
SECTION 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability;
Usage of Trade
RAY V. DEAS
144 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965)
Plaintiff broke a tooth while biting into a "hard, unyielding substance"
imbedded in a hamburger sandwich sold to her by the defendant restaurateur.
Plaintiff commenced an action for damages alleging negligence and breach of
implied warranty. The lower court overruled defendant's demurrer and the
appellate court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff had stated a cause • of
action in both negligence and warranty. As to the warranty count, the court
noted that Section 2-314 abrogates prior Georgia case law which had pro-
hibited an action in warranty against a restaurateur who furnished unwhole-
some food for consumption on the premises because such transaction "did not
amount to a sale." Under Section 2-314, "the serving for value of food or
drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale," to which
a warranty of merchantability is implied.
M.L.G.
SECTION 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties
Express or Implied
SUVADA V. WHITE MOTOR CO.
210 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1965)
Plaintiff purchased from the defendant White Motor Conipany a recondi-
tioned tractor unit. The brake system for the tractor was manufactured by
the co-defendant Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Company and
installed by White. Some months later, the brake system failed and the
tractor collided with a bus, injuring several passengers and causing severe
damage to both the tractor and the bus. Plaintiff brought suit for damages
sustained in repairing the tractor and in settlement of personal injury claims.
The trial court found that plaintiff had stated a cause of action against White
for damage to its tractor unit on the basis of breach of implied warranty and
negligence, and against Bendix on the basis of negligence, but dismissed
plaintiff's other claim for damages. The appellate court held that the plaintiff
had stated a cause of action against White and Bendix for all damages on the
basis of a breach of implied warranty. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 51 Ill.
App. 2d 318, 201 N.E.2d 313 (1964), annot. 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 593
(1965).
The supreme court affirmed, declaring the law of Illinois to be that the
manufacturer or seller of a product which is dangerous when defective is
strictly liable in tort, regardless of any negligence. The court rejected Bendix's
argument that lack of privity is a defense under Section 2-318 of the Code,
stating: "our holding of strict liability in tort makes it unnecessary to decide
what effect Section 2-318 has on the action for breach of warranty."
COMMENT
See Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965),
noted 7 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 767 (1966).
M.L.G.
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SECTION 2-725. Statute of Limitations in Contracts for Sale
LEWIS V. FOOD MACH. & CHEM. CORP.
245 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Mich. 1965)
On August 6, 1956, plaintiff, a Pennsylvania resident, purchased a
potato harvester manufactured by the defendant, a Delaware corporation.
On August 6, 1962, plaintiff commenced this action in a federal court in
Michigan, alleging a violation of Sections 2-313 and -315 of the Pennsylvania
Code, in that the machine had not performed as warranted. The defendant
moved for summary judgment, contending that the four-year statute of limita-
tions of Section 2-725 had run. The court denied defendant's motion and held
that the Michigan six-year statute of limitations applied. It reasoned that the
Code's four-year statute of limitations is procedural, and, not being in-
tegrally connected with the plaintiff's cause of action, is therefore not a
part of Pennsylvania substantive law. It thus concluded that "it was required
to apply the applicable Michigan statute of limitations," and held that plain-
tiff's action had been seasonably brought.
COMMENT
While the Code had been enacted, it was not effective in Michigan at the
date of this case. Had it been applicable, there would be no doubt that
Section 2-725 would have controlled and that the defendant's motion would
have been granted. This was the result reached when the same case was previ-
ously presented to the Pennsylvania court. Lewis v. Jacobson, 30 D. & C.2d
623 (Erie County Ct., Pa., 1962). See Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa.
107, 207 A.2d 823 (1965), annot. 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 103 (1965).
There is also little doubt as to the correctness of the court's determination
that the Pennsylvania statute of limitations, Section 2-725, is procedural
rather than substantive. See Natale v. Upjohn Co., 236 F. Supp. 37 (D. Del.
1964), annot. 6 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 783 (1965).
M.L.G.
LYBECKER V. UNITED PAC. INS. CO .
406 P.2d 945 (Wash. 1965)
Plaintiffs had agreed to sell their crops to the bankrupt, a commission
merchant, for specified amounts payable during 1959. Two of the plaintiffs
had executed written contracts while two had made oral agreements with the
bankrupt. The bankrupt was required to post a bond by statute, and the
defendant was surety on the bond. The first of these actions was commenced
against the surety three years and two days after the due date set forth on
one of the written contracts. The trial court ruled that all four contracts, as
a matter of law, were governed by a Washington three-year statute of limita-
tions, but held that all four actions had been seasonably commenced. The
court reasoned that due to a dispute between the principals over one of the
contracts, and the absence of definite due dates in the other three, the bank-
rupt's liability on the contracts had not become final until the end of 1959.
The defendant surety appealed, claiming that, since the plaintiffs and itself
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were not in privity, its liability had been created by statute and a liability
created by statute is controlled by a Washington two-year statute of limita-
tions which would bar the plaintiffs' actions.
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the lower court's decision,
but rejected both the plaintiffs' and the defendant's contentions. Instead, the
court determined that, in Washington, claims based on written contracts are
governed by a six-year statute of limitations and those based on oral contracts
by a three-year statute of limitations. It thus held that the actions based on
the written contracts were not barred by the statute of limitations, and since
these claims by themselves totalled more than the amount of the bond, they
were sufficient to raise the question of the defendant's liability.
The court noted in a footnote that had the Uniform Commercial Code
been in effect, the four-year statute of limitations of Section 2-725 would have
controlled this case. Since that section applies to actions brought on all con-
tracts for the sale of goods, it would have governed actions based on both the
oral and the written contracts.
ARTICLE 3: COMMERCIAL PAPER
SECTION 3-301. Rights of a Holder
CITIZENS NAT'L BANK V. FORT LEE SAV. & LOAN ASS'N
213 A.2d 315 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1965)
Annotated under Section 3-302, infra.
SECTION 3-302. Holder in Due Course
CITIZENS NAT'L BANK V. FORT LEE SAV. & LOAN ASS'N
213 A.2d 315 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1965)
Plaintiff bank's depositor, Winter, entered into a contract for the sale of
real estate with the defendant Amoroso, who requested the Fort Lee Savings
and Loan Association, the co-defendant, to issue its check in the amount of
$3,100 to her for use as a deposit on the contract. Fort Lee Savings complied
by drawing against its account with Fort Lee Trust Co. Before the deposit,
Winter's account had a balance of $225. Because of this deposit, plaintiff
honored checks totaling $1,290 drawn against Winter's account. Amoroso, in
the meantime, had learned of a previous sale of the real estate and demanded
the return of the check. She contended that Winter had admitted the fraud
and promised to return the deposit. Before making any refund, however,
Winter committed suicide. Amoroso then requested Fort Lee Savings to stop
payment on the check. A written stop payment order was received by the
drawee bank, Fort Lee Trust, prior to clearance of the check, and upon
presentment, notice of non-payment was transmitted to the plaintiff which
then commenced this suit to recover the amount it had advanced to Winter.
The court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and held that
both Fort Lee Savings, as drawer of the check, and Amoroso, as indorser of
the check, were liable under Sections 3-413(2) and -414(1) respectively.
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